《正義和平通訊》「中國內望」專欄：從薄熙來案看中國法治問題

發表於香港天主教正義和平委員會 《正義和平通訊》2013年10月號「中國內望」專欄：

從薄熙來案看中國法治問題

潘嘉偉
香港天主教正義和平委員會委員、國是組召集人

文章連結：http://www.hkjp.org/files/files/enews/hkjp_Sep2013_p12-13_preview.pdf

The Human Rights Implications of China’s Slowdown

Published in The Diplomat on September 20, 2013

By Su-Mei Ooi and Patrick Poon

China’s economic slowdown will have an adverse impact on human rights. In fact, it already is.

Since Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang took power in March, activists in China have come under increasing pressure from authorities. As more and more detentions and arrests took place over the summer, human rights defenders have come to expect further violations of civil and political rights. The pattern of recent violations and its correspondence with a slowdown in economic growth seems to suggest that any further economic trouble is likely to have a negative impact on human rights in the near term.

Among those most recently detained have been human rights defenders, the most renowned of whom is Dr. Xu Zhiyong, founder of the now-banned NGO Open Constitution Initiative (Gongmengand, later, Gongmin), which provided legal assistance to disempowered groups seeking redress for official abuse. Xu is also co-founder of the New Citizens' Movement, a loosely connected network of human rights defenders, dissidents and ordinary citizens, who since 2012 have been demanding that government officials disclose their wealth. Their appeal is actually in line with President Xi's efforts to crack down on corruption and impose austerity measures on government officials, but Xu's arrest now raises questions about this commitment, and suggests that China is becoming even less tolerant of dissent than before.

Formerly a lecturer in law at Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications and a visiting scholar at Yale Law School, Xu's detention on 16 July attracted immediate international attention. He was previously detained for three weeks in late July 2009 after Gongmeng was shut down and fined 1.4 million yuan for failing to pay taxes. Prior to his recent detention, Xu, deemed a threat to stability, had already been placed under house arrest for three months while the NPC and CPPCC held meetings. International interest in his case is due in part to the fact that Xu’s arrest on suspicion of "assembling a crowd to disrupt order in a public place" seems incomprehensible. Xu’s role in the New Citizens' Movement is better likened to spiritual leadership in calling for citizens' participation in pro-establishment actions. In a blog post explaining his vision for a "New Citizens' Movement" on May 29, Xu wrote that the political movement was not meant to encourage the overthrow of the current regime, but to build a civil society that “will do away with tyranny.”

According to information compiled by Chinese media expert and online activist Wen Yunchao, and Xu's friend and legal scholar-activist Teng Biao, more than 100 dissidents have been detained or arrested in the first six months of this year. About a fifth of them took part in the New Citizens' Movement, while 38 others were taken into custody for organizing and participating in other public collective actions not directly related to the New Citizens Movement. The number of detained activists is increasing, with the latest being well-known Guangdong rights activist Guo Feixiong, aka Yang Maodong, who was detained on August 8 on suspicion of "disrupting public order." Guo had helped organize a signature campaign to urge the National People’s Congress to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in March.

This wave of arrests and detentions of activists that emphasize citizens’ rights and call for greater government accountability is telling. China has been experiencing a slowdown in economic growth for the last five quarters. Projected fears of what the future holds for China’s economy might explain heightened sensitivities to grassroots demands to deal seriously with seemingly intractable governance issues that are likely to drag seriously on growth when investment-led strategies are no longer feasible. On the one hand, any serious fight against corruption will require the support of party elders in the CPC; on the other, the failure to grapple with the problem over the years has already begun to spook international investors. It may therefore seem necessary to muzzle voices that call for too much too quickly, when heightened expectations generated by Xi’s own rhetoric cannot realistically be met. As many more start to feel the squeeze of a slowing economy, these demands might also find resonance with a growing social base.

In the face of economic trouble, China’s leaders have also had to seriously consider how China’s economy can be rebalanced away from investment-led growth towards a version that is driven by consumption. After many false starts, this necessary task promises to be complicated and fraught with political difficulty, and all eyes are now on the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, scheduled for November. Many remain skeptical that real economic reform will take place precisely because of the kinds of changes necessitated by the rebalancing. Reform of China’s financial sector, state enterprises and the hukou system are just some areas that will create conflicts of interest at a juncture where the new administration has still to consolidate its power base. Rebalancing China’s economy is also easier said than done. A comfortable middle class with disposable income is indispensable to the consumption-led growth model, yet such a middle class is missing in China. While rolling back state-owned enterprises in the economy might mean greater space for resource-starved small and medium enterprises to thrive as a basis for consumption-led growth, a tightening of monetary policy could at the same time create a cash crunch that would affect middle-income business development adversely. Ultimately, rebalancing will require that both investment and consumption decelerate in the short term, making it extremely difficult to continue delivering on even current rates of growth. In the face of such political and economic uncertainty, the last thing that China’s top leadership now needs is activists who frame past policy failures in terms of the “tyranny” of an oligarchic government. As such, more crackdowns can be expected.

The real reason why China’s economic slowdown is likely to negatively impact human rights domestically lies not with the fact that demands for government accountability draw negative attention to governance issues that cannot be effectively dealt with in the immediate term or difficult reforms that might not work out. In truth, it is not only the legitimacy of Xi’s administration that will be called into question if such demands cannot be met, but the “performance legitimacy” of the CPC to date. This is because, some of the greatest threats to the future of China’s economic prosperity lies with the pathologies of China’s investment-led growth model, one of which is of course endemic corruption. Understanding China’s economic slowdown as merely an instance of inevitable middle-income trap that requires a rebalancing of the economy toward consumer driven growth is to miss the more disturbing structural problems that cast a dark shadow over China’s economic future.

One of the key pathologies is that of overwhelming local government debt, which is causing real concern about the overall state of China’s financial sector. A 2010 audit report found that the 10.7 trillion yuan debt was caused by at times questionable infrastructural investment decisions made by local officials, whose career advancement prospects are dependent upon short term growth, along with official excesses following the 2008 credit binge. This debt continued to grow, rising 13% by 2012, after Beijing’s clean-up order, as spending on infrastructure and development projects continued – despite diminishing returns on investment. The National Audit Office has since been charged by the State Council to conduct an urgent audit in July, as serious doubts surface about just how much of this debt consists of bad loans. In the meantime, a 2012 Amnesty International report already suggests that instances of violent forced evictions have increased as local officials seek to offset huge debts by seizing and selling land to property developers. As forced evictions, poor social programs and environmental problems continue for the sake of dubious developmental projects, dissatisfaction with the government will rise and activists such as Xu will continue to call for greater governmental accountability, necessitating tighter controls over dissent.

China’s economic slowdown has already had and will continue to have negative implications for human rights in the near future. It is indeed ironic that at such a time, China is preparing to bid for re-election to the United Nations Human Rights Council in November.

Su-Mei Ooi is assistant professor of political science at Butler University, where she teaches International Relations and Asian politics. Patrick Poon is a PhD Candidate in the Faculty of Law at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and was Executive Secretary of the China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group. 

示威集會權利被日漸抹黑

示威集會權利被日漸抹黑

2013年8月25日發表於香港公教報「義筆容辭」專欄


潘嘉偉

近日接二連三的街頭事件，令警民關係緊張再次成為焦點，不得不慨嘆一句，香港政府與香港社會是否患了重病？特首梁振英、警方、政府官員和建制派人士不斷放話把市民參與示威及街頭活動渲染成不和平與鬧事，甚至縱容親建制人士及疑似黑社會人士挑釁參與街頭活動的市民，香港市民受《基本法》第二十七條保障的遊行集會自由正有被日漸侵蝕的趨勢。

小學老師林慧思因目睹法輪功學員在旺角行人專用區擺檔被親建制的香港青年關愛協會（簡稱「青關會」）騷擾，路見不平，對警方縱容青關會成員騷擾非常不滿，在與現場警員說理的時候衝口而出說了一句粗言穢語，隨即被網上傳播，鋪天蓋地般被批評和攻擊，其後，更引發至八月四日香港家長聯會會長李偲嫣、退休前休假的警司劉達強等人在旺角站台批評林慧思，現場批評和支持林老師的公眾情況緊張，但竟然有休班警員被發現懷疑推撞記者和支持林老師的市民。

在一週後的星期日八月十一日，特首梁振英到天水圍落區出席地區論壇，但其表現完全不是聽取市民意見，場內絕大多數是挺梁振英人士，而梁振英向市民說的卻是吩咐教育局局長吳克儉就林老師事件提交報告，不禁令人懷疑為甚麼針對一位老師的做法那麼徹底，即使林老師當時在警員面前衝口而出說了一句髒話，有必要把事件提升到要局長就此提交報告嗎？

更甚的是，梁振英竟然在這個所謂地區論壇為被廉署調查的前行政會議成員林奮強和張震遠呼冤，說廉署已證明對兩人的指控證據不足，但舉報二人的政黨卻沒有「私下或公開說一句半句抱歉」，市民有義務舉報懷疑觸犯貪污的案件，調查證據應是廉署的責任，怎能怪責和要求市民或政黨因廉署沒有找到證據而要就舉報案件道歉，那樣還有誰會敢於舉報懷疑貪污的案件？除了場內只有梁振英講沒有機會讓市民發言之外，場外更有參與示威的市民被懷疑是黑社會人士毆打，警方卻只說場內秩序良好和場外有零星示威，最後有幾名人士分別以普通襲擊、涉嫌公眾地方行為不檢和襲警被捕。


執筆當天八月十八日，梁振英又再次落區到觀塘一間中學出席地區論壇，場外再次有大批市民抗議，警方如臨大敵派出大批警員維持秩序，筆者在現場所見參與示威的市民都十分守秩序，但竟然有六名人士被捕。筆者感到梁振英落區的做法令市民與警察之間產生更強烈的對峙感，在現場的示威者與撐梁振英的建制派人士很容易發生互相挑釁的行為。梁振英及其班子在民望低迷的情況再繼續這樣落區做騷，得到的效果只是令參與示威集會的市民感到隨時要與身份撲朔迷離的疑似建制派人士對峙，同時又擔心警方會怎樣對待示威人士，在這樣複雜的情況下，不論示威有多和平理性，參與示威的市民很容易會被抹黑為搞事份子，令沉默的大多數更不敢參與集會示威，間接令示威集會權利進一步被削弱。

七十後公民，出來吧！

原來很討厭把人分年齡階層，但香港近幾年的社會發展，無不令我想想年齡和成長的年代背景是否影響了公民意識和公民參與。

我們七十後這一代，我覺得因為成長年代的背景，使我們不像八十後和九十後那樣形成至少一些主動走出來關注社會和參與社會行動的領頭人物。

最近有跟幾位八十後朋友聊天談及這個問題，我不懂分析七十後普遍較少參與社運的原因，或許是因為香港八十年代和九十年代初經濟蓬勃，我們這一代幸運地在香港最富庶的年代成長，物質的充裕令我們對政治不感興趣，又或許是因為我們中學時代還是殖民地時代，政治冷感彷彿是理所當然。

九十年代末上的大學時候，甚至感到學生會的同學太激進，安份守己地讀書和享受大學幾年無拘無束的日子，大家都覺得是理所當然的。

七十後出生的到現在這個年紀不少都已婚和有小孩，出來參與社會運動和政治運動，看來心裡都覺得好像不太成熟，像我這樣被動地參與社會運動的，或許會被同輩和老一輩認為不切實際，空談理想，有些甚至以為我要參政。公民參與和參政，對我們這一代和我們上一代的人來說，好像甚難理解。

如今看見香港的所謂特首梁振英，他不是我們公民選出來的，他現在做甚麼，說甚麼，難道我們就沒有一點感覺？再看陳茂波，他對著市民一次又一次撒謊。試問香港政府官員，我們還能相信哪一位？

我只是一名關注社會和香港民主發展的普通公民，懇切希望我們七十後這一代，能有一些領袖人物出來，帶領我們和充滿希望的八十後和九十後年青人，甚至是2000年後出生的年輕人，一起成為真正的公民，關心政治，為香港政治前景出一分力。希望六十後和五十後的前輩朋友也不要忘了成為真正的公民。

檢視中國大陸的言論自由

（發表於香港「民間人權陣線」 《民陣十年－－700萬人的故事》）

檢視中國大陸的言論自由

潘嘉偉
獨立中文筆會常務秘書

獨立中文筆會是全世界用中文寫作、編輯、翻譯、研究和出版文學作品人士的非政府、非營利、非政黨跨國界組織。獨立中文筆會於2001年由一批流亡中文作家及中國國內作家創立，創會成員中，首任主席劉賓雁曾被前美國筆會主席、著名作家阿瑟‧米勒（Arthur Miller）稱為「中國良心」；前會長鄭義是八十年代「反思文學」先驅者之一；2010年諾貝爾和平獎得主劉曉波曾任兩屆會長。其他曾擔任理事的著名作家包括：六十年代已活躍於民間文學創作的四川《野草》詩社主要詩人蔡楚、作家余杰、作家廖亦武、詩人孟浪、小說家馬建和詩人楊煉等。

獨立中文筆會於2001年在倫敦舉行的第67屆國際筆會代表大會中獲接納為國際筆會下屬分會，現時約有三百名會員，百分之六十在中國大陸。由於會員在世界不同角落，會員主要透過互聯絡作文學和言論自由等議題的交流。獨立中文筆會一直與國際筆會及其他筆會在國際社會呼籲要求中國釋放所有獄中作家，並為獄中作家及其家屬提供人道援助，舉辦週年頒獎禮以肯定中國及其他身處沒有言論自由國家的作家，舉辦與言論自由相關的文學研討會，以及出版關於獄中作家的書籍及選輯出版部分中國大陸異見作家的作品。國際筆會是世界上歷史最悠久的人權組織和國際性組織，1921年由一班著名作家在倫敦成立，致力維護全球作家的言論和寫作自由，維護世界各地因從事其專業工作而遭監禁、威嚇、迫害或打壓的作家和新聞工作者的權益。國際筆會現時有146個下屬分會，於聯合國教科文組織和聯合國經濟社會理事會擁有非政府組織諮詢地位。

香港在九七回歸中國後，香港言論自由的狀況與中國大陸的言論自由狀況息息相關，而香港言論自由長遠能否得以維持又與普選是否得以落實有不可分割的關係。二零零三年七月一日，五十萬香港人上街遊行反對《基本法》二十三條立法，不但激起了香港人關心言論自由的問題，在烈日當空下遊行仍秩序井然，並最終令香港政府擱置立法，亦令中國大陸不少異見人士對那麼多香港人為了爭取保持自由走出來羨慕不已。獨立中文筆會在香港只有約十位會員，但差不多每年都有參與七一遊行，拉著「要求釋放獄中作家，捍衛言論自由」的橫額走入遊行隊伍中。對中國大陸的異見人士來說，香港人走出來捍衛自己的自由具有十分重要的指標性意義。《基本法》二十三條所涵蓋的關於國家安全的條文，正正就是內地異見人士，特別是異見作家及維權人士，常常面對被捕和被起訴的罪名－－「煽動顛覆國家政權罪」。這條罪名內容含糊，讓公安及檢察機關輕易引用，以所謂「維護國家穩定」為藉口，處罰批評政府的人士。

因「煽動顛覆國家政權罪」曾被判刑或現仍在獄中的著名異見作家或維權人士多不勝數，維權人士之間簡稱這條罪名為「煽顛」。因撰寫六篇文章批評北京奧運及官員貪腐的維權人士胡佳，他於二零零八年四月被判刑三年半，刑滿出獄後繼續受到看守人員在家外嚴密監視，他仍然積極參與關注其他維權人士的狀況，並因此繼續備受打壓；二零零八年五月四川汶川大地震後，維權人士譚作人因為揭露「豆腐渣工程」問題，卻突然因為幾篇數年前寫關於六四的文章被控「煽顛」，判刑五年；北京作家劉曉波因為參與起草呼籲政治改革、改善人權與法治的《零八憲章》，被重判十一年監禁，妻子劉霞大部分時間被軟禁在家，兩夫婦同樣失去自由，劉曉波獲得2010年諾貝爾和平獎後，中國政府甚至對劉霞進一步監控，除了被軟禁在家，更被切斷與外界的聯絡，無法上網或以手機聯絡，甚至突然抓捕和起訴劉霞弟弟劉暉「詐騙」，中國政府看來是想以各種方式折磨劉霞，迫使劉曉波離開中國。

像胡佳、譚作人和劉曉波這樣因為「煽顛」被捕或坐牢的人有增加趨勢，有些甚至只是在網上發表意見或轉發微博的普通老百姓。據獨立中文筆會收集的資料，至今仍有37名獄中作家，當中大部分包括曾在網上發表文章批評政府的作家，也包括在二零零八年三月十四日在西藏拉薩反抗中國政府行動後傳播訊息的藏族作家，以及在二零零九年七月五日在新疆烏魯木齊抗議事件後傳播訊息的維吾爾族作家。

當大家擔心香港政府會重提《基本法》第二十三條立法，我們必須要認清和承認一個事實，我們要面對的不是梁振英這個傀儡特首或以為自己「好打得」的林鄭月娥或其他香港政府官員或只懂為自身利益奉承中央的建制派人士，而是經歷了多次政治挑戰而仍然當權的中國共產黨。故此，不論是港獨或本土派，大家都要承認政治現實，我們的對手是這個製造過無數文字獄和政活鬥爭的中共政權。不論我們情感上是否願意具體認識中國大陸，除了空泛地或不屑一顧地說中國大陸沒有法治，甚或認為中國大陸因為有法不依而所以他們的法律不值一提，但筆者認為只有知己知彼，我們才能有效應對。因此，當我們在爭取香港普選的同時，我們要以中國大陸現在的言論自由和獄中作家的狀況作為借鏡，同樣，若香港沒有普選，難保繼續由中央欽點的特首會堅持香港的言論自由，我們更無法肯定可以長遠享有言論自由，中國大陸的言論自由狀況則只會更進一步倒退。

人權GDP負増長

很榮幸我的拙作能發表在這本有81位作者關於中國人權的書--台灣關懷中國人權聯盟出版的＜中國生死書＞

人權GDP負増長

潘嘉偉

獨立中文筆會理事、常務秘書

在自由的社會裡，人權捍衛者備受尊崇，他們代表著社會的良心，媒體追訪的對像；但在中國，人權捍衛者遭受各種打壓，沒有言論自由，面對隨時被監視、傳喚、恐嚇、失蹤、毆打、軟禁、監視居住、勞動教養或監禁。

中國政府打壓異見份子及維權人手法層出不窮，真的可以用中國官員經常掛在口邊的說話來形容，深具「中國特色」。有些極權國家或軍政府政權，可能使用法外謀殺的手段消除異己，但中共已執政六十四年並經歷多次政治運動和公民抗命運動，卻仍屹立不倒，她採用的手段是製造白色恐怖，長期拘禁一些異見人士，以求達到殺雞儆猴和滅聲的效果。

筆者自大學畢業從事記者工作，最初擔任法庭記者工作時，每天進出法院，看到香港有司法獨立的可貴，隨後轉到一家天主教新聞機構工作，開始有機會親身接觸中國大陸的老百姓，採訪對像主要是中國天主教會人士，與他們的會面中，深深感受到他們宗教自由和個人自由受到的限制。

2004年開始，筆者全職投身人權組織工作，最初接觸的是勞工權益的問題，農民工從偏遠省份的鄉村千里迢迢地跑到沿海城市的工廠打工，與家人分隔千里，卻經常要超時工作，賺取微薄工資，有些更因為工作環境惡劣而不幸患上職業病。

及後，再轉到由香港立法會議員何俊仁、劉慧卿與幾位律師和大律師成立的中國維權律師關注組工作，關注的群體是當時正冒起而較少人關注的維權律師，他們面對的各種打壓，除了與其他維權人士一樣，人身自由受到限制，他們也甚至因為幫助其他維權人士、法輪功學員、訪民而失去執業權利，讓人覺得心寒。北京維權律師高智晟因為寫公開信呼籲中共領導人停止打壓法輪功學員，結果自己也身陷囹圄，不單被長期拘禁，並受到嚴重的酷刑對待，妻子和子女被迫流亡美國。山東失明維權人士陳光誠因揭露地方官員計劃生育強迫婦女墮胎，被莫須有罪名監禁，出獄後與妻子仍是被嚴密監視，甚至毆打，最終在眾多朋友協助下全家離開中國到紐約，但陳光誠在山東的姪兒陳克貴與大哥陳光福仍受到嚴重的報復和打擊。還有，為法輪功學員辯護而被司法局以破壞法庭秩序吊銷執業資格的唐吉田與劉巍；因為參與維權而被注銷執業資格的江天勇、滕彪、溫海波、唐荊陵等律師；各地近年興起發起律師互相救助的律師團等等，都可看出維權律師的處境有多險惡。

繼而在處理和跟進個案的過程中，筆者接觸到不少被以言入罪的作家與文字工作者，然後在朋友介紹下加入獨立中文筆會，進一步了解到中國言論自由狀況有多糟糕。好幾年前，在網上有幸與北京作家劉曉波有過短暫交流，但2008年12月8日，他便因為參與起草「零八憲章」被帶走，最後更以「煽動顛覆國家政權」被重判11年監禁，雖然他獲得2010年諾貝爾和平獎，但仍然被監禁，妻子劉霞仍是大部分時間被軟禁在家。很多其他維權人士同樣因為「煽動顛覆國家政權罪」、「顛覆國家政權罪」或「洩露國家機密」而被長期監禁，例如：南京的郭泉、楊天水、四川的譚作人、許萬成、山東的齊崇懷等等；還有因在網上發表關於藏民或維吾爾族被打壓的文章或訊息而以「煽動分裂國家罪」或「分裂國家罪」的藏族及維吾爾作家。據獨立中文筆會的資料，仍有約40位作家身在獄中，對言論自由的箝制，走在世界前列。

近年，中國政府每年都標榜GDP増長達百分之八或以上，2008年舉辦了北京奧運，2010年舉辦了上海世博，2012年又有了莫言獲得諾貝爾文學獎，各大城市高樓林立，表面看來繁華盛世，但監禁異見人士仍然繼續，現今已是全球第二大經濟體系的國民卻沒有言論自由，沒有網絡自由，要翻牆才能看「面書」和「推特」，「微博」隨時被刪賬號、被刪貼或被禁留言，多少經濟增長還不如對「維穩費」的遞增比例。這樣的國家，人權GDP只有不斷負増長。

Some Thoughts on Diplomatic Dialogue with China on Human Rights Issues

Patrick Poon

Because of my previous jobs on advocating for the rights of workers and human rights lawyers and my current job for fighting for the freedom of expression of writers, I have had many opportunities to meet with many diplomats to share my views on human rights situations in China.

From time to time, I get the impression that they are concerned whether they should adopt a more critical approach to criticize China's appalling human rights records or focusing on the positive developments in China.

I am always skeptical about why we should focus on the positive developments while not addressing the deteriorating human rights records. My question is: China has now developed to become the second largest economy in the world. Why do we still want to hold double standards when we address the human rights problems in China with the usual excuse that "China is still not ready for legal and political reforms"?

Sometimes, I am very shocked to hear comments like we should appreciate that there have been more passionate and heated debates about new laws and policies among academics and officials, especially the younger ones who have studied overseas. Some people might believe these are positive signs. My another question is: "What about the implementation of these laws and policies?" I am puzzled to hear some comments that implementation is a separate issue.

I am sorry to say that but I do feel that some diplomats have missed the point and don't understand Chinese politics. Of course, we have many reasons to be optimistic, including believing in the goodwill of some young and rising academics and officials. But are we telling the 1.3 billion people that they should believe in the less than 1 percent of elites and rely on them to hopefully make some progress in pushing for legal and political reforms?

While we recognize that there have been some improvements, we should not give in on any fundamental principle of universal human rights standards. Why should China be exempted? It is strange for diplomats from well developed democracies to accept China's excuse to delay its commitment to legal and political reforms while acknowledging merely the small improvements. Remember, China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1998 but still hasn't ratified it yet. If liberal democratic countries are only concerned about doing business with China and compromise on human rights concerns, what is the point of claiming to uphold the international human rights standards in the United Nations?

【義筆容辭】家暴受害者成死囚

http://kkp.org.hk/node/4602

【義筆容辭】家暴受害者成死囚 

作者: 潘嘉偉

刊登日期: 2013.02.15

四川近日發生一宗駭人聽聞的死刑案件，長期被丈夫虐待的婦人李彥在兩年前一次家庭爭執中，錯手殺了丈夫並分屍和拋棄屍體。事件引起內地熱烈討論是否應該對李彥執行死刑。

據專門接辦及研究死刑案件的北京興善研究所的資料，四川資陽安岳縣的李彥於二OO九年三月與譚勇結婚前，譚勇有過三次失敗的婚姻，李彥不理家人反對堅持嫁給譚勇；但婚後譚勇暴躁性格不改，經常對李彥拳打腳踢，後來兩人又相繼失業，陷入窘境。據國際特赦組織的資料，李彥曾被丈夫以煙蒂掐於其臉上；曾在嚴冬被鎖在住所露台外數小時。雖然李彥曾在一次被虐待後需要入院治療，並報警及向有關部門求助，但事件沒有獲跟進，沒有展開調查及未有為李彥提供保護。

事發當日二O一O年十一月三日晚上，譚勇喝醉後在廚房外用氣槍射花生玩耍，被在廚房裡洗碗的李彥阻止，譚勇威脅要射妻子臀部，兩人發生爭執，譚勇用腳踢打李彥，李用譚氏的氣槍管擊打譚勇導致他死亡。

李彥處理了譚勇的屍體，並告訴他人報警。法院一審和二審均以證據不足為由不認可李彥曾遭受家庭暴力，也不認可李彥是自首，而以李彥故意殺人、手段殘忍、後果嚴重為由判處李彥死刑。案件可能已被最高人民法院核准，李氏隨時可能被執行死刑。

從家暴受害者變成死囚，李彥的經歷讓大家思考兩個問題：（一）以死刑處罰這樣的家庭暴力悲劇受害者是否恰當？（二）如何制定防止家庭暴力以避免類似悲劇再發生？

據北京興善研究所引述，案件發生後，四川電視台採訪了李彥並製作了節目，當地有三百四十八名觀眾看後，寫請願書請求法院依法打擊犯罪的同時，能充分考慮李彥因長期遭受家暴而不堪忍受的事實，從輕處罰。

代理李彥一案覆核階段的律師、著名婦女公益律師郭建梅認為，死者對李彥長期施以家庭暴力令李彥患了「受虐婦女綜合症」，案發時她是由於再被施暴而一時怒火中燒，錯手殺死譚勇。一審和二審法院對李彥受家庭暴力的證據完全否定，可能造成判決不公。北京興善研究所所長、著名維權法律學者滕彪也認為，案件有大量證據顯示譚勇對李彥施行嚴重家庭暴力，包括李彥向安岳縣婦聯的投訴紀錄、她被暴力對待後的報警記錄，還有鄰居的證人證言等，都可以證明李彥受過嚴重家暴。

法律方面，雖然內地仍沒有防止家庭暴力的法例，但據一九九九年《全國法院維護農村穩定刑事審判工作座談會紀要》已明確指出，「對於因婚姻家庭、鄰里糾紛等民間矛盾激化引發的故意殺人犯罪，適用死刑一定要十分慎重，應當與發生在社會上的嚴重危害社會治安的其他故意殺人犯罪案件有所區別。對於被害人一方有明顯過錯或對矛盾激化負有直接責任，一般不應判處死刑立即執行。」

北京興善研究所正收集內地及世界各地人士的聯署（把姓名、職業和居住地電郵至：chinacadp@gmail.com），希望最高人民法院停止對李彥執行死刑，把案件發回重審。正委有參與的取消死刑聯合委員會已去信最高人民法院及部份港區人大代表，要求停止對李彥執行死刑，並呼籲中國政府順應全球發展趨勢，減少及停止死刑，以及最終廢除死刑。

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